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From digital naivety to digital pragmatism  
Online platforms grow exponentially. Unexpectedly for most, they 
have reached the top of the world rankings of the companies with 
highest market capitalisation. Today they keep demonstrating an 
unprecedented dynamic of further expansion, increasing vertically 
and horizontally, entering new geographic and product markets, 
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synchronising, synergising and cross-fertilising their data, algorithms 
and user experiences. Like King Midas, everything they touch, they 
turn into gold, instantly creating added value for their customers and 
shareholders. The fuel that keeps the engine on, is big data: collecting 
–> categorising –> profiling –> synchronising –> predicting –> 
targeting –> recommending –> satisfying –> and thereby being able 
to collect more: this is how the perpetual business cycle of Bentham’s 
digital panopticon and (again Bentham’s) digital ‘happiness machine’ 
functions.   
Being by its very nature rather sluggish and inert, the mainstream 
perception of online platforms was until recently deeply embedded in 
an outdated narrative of garage-entrepreneurship, egalitarianism, 
liberal-democratic altruistic evangelism, helping humankind to bid a 
final farewell to authoritarianism, obscurantism and propaganda by 
eliminating borders and multiplying possibilities for everyone. It is 
only the recent turbulence caused by fake news and the post-truth 
society, epitomised in the CambridgeAnalytica scandal, that has 
triggered a reconsideration within mainstream societal opinion as to 
the multifaceted role of online platforms. UK/EU law and policy try 
to take a lead in these processes of reconceptualisation. They aim 
inter alia to regulate the uncontrolled growth of online platforms in 
order (i) to protect competition and consumers, but also implicitly (ii) 
to mitigate the ever-expanding gap between the UK/EU on one hand 
and the US and China on the other, catching up the time and 
momentum that was lost in the decade of digital naivety. 
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As the Interim report explains, both online search- and online 
display advertising markets are highly oligopolised with Google for 
the former and Facebook & Google for the latter not only holding 
significant shares of the markets (referred to in the Interim Report as 
‘platforms with ‘Strategic Market Status’ (SMS)) but also 
demonstrating a continuous, incontestable dynamic of further 
increase. Such well-known and widely discussed principles of the 
business of digital advertising as (i) network effects, (ii) the power of 
big data, (iii) the winner-takes-most and (iv) competition for the 
market convincingly show that the trend is stable, and the current 
incumbents will continue strengthening their dominance.  
The inevitability of such universally observed systemic features of 
the digital economy as network effects and winner-takes-most also 
raise a more fundamental question: is it even possible to expect any 
meaningful and stable form of effective competition from the markets 
that demonstrate these characteristics as inherent, or would it not 
perhaps be a more realistic option to design the regulatory framework 
in a way that would internalise it from ‘bug to feature’, treating 
platforms with SMS as natural monopolies / de facto standard setters / 
public utilities / undertakings providing services of general economic 
interest or as common carriers? Putting it less controversially: would 
it not make more sense to perceive both approaches as non-
conflicting and mutually supportive? Measures taken to protect the 
competitive process and consumer interests also help to set 
expectations for higher accountability from platforms with SMS. And 
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vice versa, imposing stricter regulatory requirements on the platforms 
with SMS would also provide their competitors (and consumers) with 
a better chance of competing (and consuming) from a specific 
platform on the merits.  
The scope of the market study, and the overall legitimacy mandate 
of the CMA, requires it to focus on the issues related to the interests 
of consumers and competition. However, this does not mean that the 
broader spectrum of remedies, related to shaping the regulatory 
landscape in ways which would create room for newcomers by 
making the incumbents more fiscally accountable, should be beyond 
consideration. Both approaches constitute the subject matter of 
competition policy sensu lato, particularly given that the most 
plausible outcome of the market study will take the form of a 
recommendation to the government.  
After all, competition is an inherently macroeconomic policy. Its 
reliance on microeconomic metrics does not exhaust its broader 
public mandate, especially if the discussion takes place at the level of 
ex ante recommendations rather than the level of ex post law 
enforcement. The Interim report defines such policy 
recommendations as structural ‘[i]nterventions to address specific 
sources of market power and to promote competition’. One of these 
policy recommendations is proposed below. Its aim is to mitigate the 
current paradoxical disproportion in the digital advertising markets. 
The proposal is based on treating each instance of viewers’ 
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interactions with an ad as a separate transaction. The elaboration of 
this conception requires a reflection on the following components: (i) 
a zero-price market; (ii) UK/EU markets as net-consumers of online 
advertising; and (iii) the idea of digital taxation. 
 
 
 
On the possibility of introducing a ‘pay-per-display’ tax 
It goes without saying that the idea of a zero-price market does not 
imply that the products/services are actually provided for free. Online 
consumers pay with their data and their attention. Consumers of 
online advertising in addition pay by eventually buying advertised 
products and services. If some sort of ‘payment’ is being made and 
some added value is being created, why then is some sort of ‘tax’ not 
introduced? 
Essentially, a typical consumer in Glasgow who sees a targeted ad 
about a new Netflix show on an NYT webpage pays to (1) NYT with 
her attention, (2) Google advertising service with her data and (3) 
Netflix by buying access/subscribing (or learning more about the 
show). Also, (4) Netflix pays Google for targeting the ad, and (5) 
Google pays NYT for displaying it. Out of these 5 transactions none 
is taxed in the UK/EU. An added value is created five times, but as 
long as physical goods do not pass physical borders (or at least as 
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long as the intermediary does not declare its profit in the UK/EU), the 
domestic fiscal authorities are not engaged. Not only is the situation 
illogical, it is also unfair with regard to other consumers as well as 
with regard to other producers. 
The modelled scenario is quite typical as the UK/EU are net-buyers 
in the global digital market value chain: we consume online more 
than we produce. Essentially, all adtech infrastructure being non-
UK/EU- based, pays their taxes (or rather arranges tax break deals) 
elsewhere. Every hour, minute and second domestic consumers make 
foreign algorithms stronger by fuelling them with personal data, 
which enables better profiling and better targeted advertising, which 
in turn increases UK/EU consumers satisfaction, and their loyalty to 
the foreign online platforms. 
The most paradoxical part of this stylised model is that not only is 
the gap in these winner-takes-most markets constantly increasing due 
to the very design of the model, in many instances the UK/EU 
authorities do not receive even a (symbolic) share of the revenues 
extracted by foreign online platforms from UK/EU consumers at least 
five times per transaction. And if steps 4 and 5 in our example are 
unproblematic (foreign advertiser pays foreign intermediary and then 
foreign intermediary pays foreign publisher), not having a share in 
revenues generated by foreign (well, ‘any’) online platforms in the 
first three steps is either counterintuitive or myopic.  
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A possible way of remedying this discrepancy is to mimic the 
‘taxation’ of the value chain performed by online platforms 
themselves. The most common, generic, starting point is in using the 
pay-per-display/click formula, which is fundamentally different to the 
model applied to non-zero-price markets. In the case of the latter we 
tax facts; in the case of the former we tax assumptions about the facts, 
which should happen in the future. And if there is no guarantee that 
each particular view of an ad by a UK consumer would lead to the 
purchase, there is a guarantee though that each million views by UK 
consumers will lead to “X” amount of purchases and “Y” amount of 
non-taxed revenue. So, both types of markets generate comparable 
outcomes in pecuniary terms, but the latter is taxed, while the former 
is not.2 Firms sense this and prefer to use data-currency rather than 
money-currency, converting the former to the latter only when 
absolutely necessary. 
The situation becomes even more obvious when we look not at the 
untaxed “Y” amount of guaranteed revenues generated by each 
million views of an ad, but at the cascade of profits, improvements 
and further synergies extracted permanently out of big (personal) data 
collected from the viewers for whom the ad was displayed. The fact 
that the price is zero does not mean that the profits generated by 
processing the data is zero. It is conceptually questionable why the 
profit is taxed only at the time when (and at the jurisdiction where) 
 
2 Or taxed marginally – following various optimisations, inter-jurisdictional transactions, and only a tiny 
fraction of revenues: declared profits. 
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big data are converted into money. The ‘data qua new-oil’ truism 
works well for illustrative purposes here if we extrapolate mutatis 
mutandis this model to the situation of real oil and imagine a scenario 
in which the jurisdiction at which the oil is extracted does not receive 
any share of the revenues out of it. In the case of digital advertising, 
the situation is further exacerbated by the fact that not only do 
UK/EU consumers provide their data for free, they also become 
dependent on the ever more effective advertiser, as their choices 
become navigated, channelled and curated in the future. 
Another important specificity of the zero-price market, which 
justifies the reason for fiscal revision, is that the costs of taxation 
cannot be passed on to consumers: if advertisers began displaying 
more ads per screen, this would upset the equilibrium between the 
advertisers’ ability to display and the consumers’ willingness to 
watch ads per screen. Also, it would be economically counterintuitive 
to assume that the online platforms have not reached the imaginative 
maximum level of ads per screen already. Adding more ads would 
unbalance the established optimum, driving the consumers away (or 
in a world with no alternative, raising dissatisfaction with the status 
quo, decreasing thereby the barriers to entry for newcomers or 
increasing the momentum for incumbents’ competitors). 
 
5 reasons for introducing the ‘pay-per-display’ tax 
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There are at least five concurrent reasons for introducing the ‘pay-
per-display’ tax in the context of online platforms and digital 
advertising. The first two are implicit and strategic. They go beyond 
the scope of the market study and beyond the argument of this 
submission. Those are: (1) generating an important and stable source 
of income for the public budget and (2) remedying the disparity of the 
situation where companies extract significant revenues from the 
UK/EU consumers but pay taxes (or rather receive tax breaks) 
elsewhere, having a positive spillover effect on foreign economies 
and a negative spillover effect on UK/EU economies. 
The other three reasons are explicit and structural. They are directly 
relevant to the market study. Introducing the ‘pay-per-display’ tax 
would (3) square the equilibrium between ‘pushed’ and ‘pulled’ 
advertising, as the rivalrous (zero-sum) choices of the consumers are 
steered by targeted advertising, and producers pay premium for such 
navigation. Targeted advertising thus can be seen as a form of 
suggested, or ‘pushed ad’. The reason for taxing pushed ads is not 
conceptually different than the reason for taxing pulled ads (e.g. TV 
advertising). The absence of ‘pay-per-display’ taxation of pulled 
advertising is explained by practical reasons as tax is imposed on the 
publishers (and intermediaries) at the moment they receive the 
payment from the advertisers. The cross-border nature of the business 
model of digital advertising by online platforms does not envisage 
such an option as the payments are often done outside the tax 
jurisdiction of the UK/EU. Introducing a ‘pay-per-display’ tax would 
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allow a more accurate calculation. This reason is legitimate even if it 
concerns marginal, incremental adjustments. 
In addition to the above, (4) introducing a ‘pay-per-display’ tax 
would remedy the existing disparity with untaxed added value 
generated out of processing big data. While the main addressee for 
reason 3 is the publisher and the situation with the pushed advertising 
model is not conceptually different to the situation with the pulled 
advertising model, the main addressees of reason 4 are the range of 
intermediaries matching advertisers, publishers and consumers (i.e. 
online platforms). Even if most of the added value they produce is 
generated from algorithms, skill and luck, at least some is generated 
from big (personal) data, which consumers ‘pay’ to them by receiving 
in return free content, curation and other personalised services. These 
zero-price payments are currently not taxed, which is a lacuna. Last 
but not least (5) ‘pay-per-display’ taxation would have a positive 
impact on the competitive dynamics of the market by making online 
platforms with SMS more accountable, enabling thereby existing and 
potential competitors more room for action. 
The prima facie categorical allure of this proposal could be easily 
scaled by opting for a low/symbolic taxation rate. Its potential 
discouraging implications for small and medium-sized companies, 
competitors and newcomers could be easily avoided by selecting a 
minimum annual turnover threshold, which companies have to pass to 
qualify for the ‘pay-per-display’ tax – or it could be applied 
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progressively: the higher the turnover, the higher the rate. Even if not 
applied at this stage, it is important to articulate the conceptual 
inevitability and practical availability of this instrument as an 
effective remedy in the toolbox of the UK/EU regulatory authorities. 
Digital Services Tax as an alternative 
Revenues earned by online platforms from 1 April 2020 will be 
subject to new 2% Digital Services Tax (search engines, social media 
platforms and online marketplaces). Only companies with global 
annual turnover of £500 million (5% of which is generated in the UK) 
will be liable to the tax. According to the HM Revenue & Customs 
Policy Paper ‘Introduction of the new Digital Services Tax’, 
‘advertising revenues are derived from UK users when the 
advertisement is intended to be viewed by a UK user’.3  
In their consultation on introducing the Digital Services Tax HM 
Treasury and HM Revenues & Customs were considering the option 
discussed in this paper,4 but have decided to take an alternative 
approach, applying taxation in a less differentiated manner. 
Compared to the existing situation when taxes are imposed on profits 
rather than revenues, the Digital Services Tax is an important step, 
which will mitigate the existing disproportions. However, it is likely 
 
3 HM Revenue & Customs Policy Paper ‘Introduction of the new Digital Services Tax’, 11 July 2019, available 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/introduction-of-the-new-digital-services-tax/introduction-of-
the-new-digital-services-tax 
4 HM Treasury and HM Revenues & Customs, ‘Digital Services Tax: Consultation’, November 2018, available 
at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/754975/Digita
l_Services_Tax_-_Consultation_Document_FINAL_PDF.pdf 
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that most of tax optimisation techniques used now, could mutatis 
mutandis be used with regard to the Digital Services Tax. 
The selected approach implies taxation of revenues rather than 
transactions. Monitoring and calculating revenues generated from UK 
users requires an access to information about transactions between 
advertisers and intermediaries, which often take place outside the UK 
jurisdiction, so the picture is likely to be fragmented and incomplete.  
There is a direct correlation and causation between the amount of 
times, which a targeted advertisement is displayed for the selected 
viewers and the revenue generated from these interactions. The 
proposed pay-per-display approach would also allow a more accurate 
calculation of views actually generated in the UK.  
